IO after the community shift back to CYBER/EW/SIGINT?

[das]

Well, maybe it's true that the IW/CT Community "[doesn't] do IO" — that doesn't mean "the Navy" doesn't do IO, and the existence of NIOC Norfolk, the NPS IO Center, etc., at least partially demonstrates this fact (and yes, NIOC Norfolk is a part of us, but even hearing how I have heard some senior officers talk about it..."Oh, yeah, NIOC Norfolk...that's kind of a weird thing among the NIOCs..."). The IW/CT Community Foundational Principles as endorsed by our Flag Deck essentially says we have "expertise in" SIGINT, cyber, and EW ("EMS and networks"), and "understanding of" IO ("MISO, MILDEC, and OPSEC"). I think it's pretty clear that our community, as a rule, doesn't do holistic IO — even though we are generally seen in a joint context as that component of the Navy that does do full-spectrum IO. Perhaps we need to fix that perception regardless of whatever solutions may be determined for Navy IO.

[telowery]

While IO may appear to be a "gap" in Navy capabilities, based on my experience as an IO planner on a JTF staff (Navy was lead component), it's not a huge issue. If the Navy is the SUPPORTED commander then it's the responsibility of the supporting components to contribute planning efforts aligned with their strengths with the JMD (or GCC if no JMD is approved) providing additional personnel to fill gaps within the SUPPORTED staff. During CONOP development we leaned heavily on Army personnel assigned to us as well as the GCC to assist with IO planning. And normally the SUPPORTED CDR depends on other service experts with other areas of planning such as Air Force personnel assisting with Air Ops planning, etc.. Bottom line, there will be small, unique scenarios where dedicated Navy IO Planners would be needed, but we need to focus our limited resources on our core mission areas of SIGINT and Cyber and all the types of each (Air, Surface, NSW, Cyber Protect, Cyber ISR, etc.) that already have resource shortfalls to ensure we're true experts in jobs we spend 95% of our time.

[yoshi]

@Sum1:
I understand where you are coming from, and completely understand the points you make. However, neither our community nor the Navy does IO. The IW/CT community does not do full spectrum IO and the fact we are viewed that way by anyone is telling. So, yeah, perhap we should "correct the perception" (!), get out of the IO business and employ our O5s in milestone jobs we value. Perhaps the IO unicorn at FCC can help. Or, I suppose we could wait another decade. A decade ago our community said we are IO, but we didn't follow through. Why?? Cyber grew, leaders changed, we started coming home from ground wars in which IO really did matter, ADM Rogers said we don't do IO, etc, etc. Lots of reasons why we don't do it, but in the end our community failed to establish IO in the Navy. But, we still have billets which are IO related in a number of places, and what can/should our community do with them? Our unwillingness to figure out what to do with IO, our O5 operational milestone billets, etc conveys some of the more serious flaws of our community leadership.

The overall impact of not having IO in the Navy is seemingly negligible, as we aren't getting shot at and a Navy IO failure is not recognized when it occurs, except in places such as yours (where JOPES, MCPP, etc is involved) where it is all supposed to come together. And, besides, the Army is willing to write it, right? Most of our IO failure is edited out and doesn't make it into briefs anyway. No one at any level wants to say they failed to properly integrate IRCs from the outset because they didn't know what they were doing or who they were supposed to talk to. The real story about IO isn't about the negative consequences of not doing it (there really aren't many), but rather the lack of positives/efficiency because we don't do it. If done properly, IO conducted at the COCOM level dictates operations, as well as their sequence and pace. I believe that is probably why we tried to take it on 10+years ago. But, we went a different way when cyber grew and our leadership changed. I'm not sure we would have been successful at the strategic level, anyway, given our strong proclivity to stay tactical. We still talk about how "operational" we are (particularly with cyber), but rarely can show what those efforts mean to the Fleet, CSG, ARG Commander. Whoops, went Navy for a sec, sorry :-) In any case, I just wish the community would move us on, rather than continuing on in an obtuse manner.

[LIVINGIW]

My $0.02....

I was in the N39 on a #d fleet staff and we were very focused on one pillar and much less so on the others. Granted, that is now 10 years dated and times have changed.

In a more recent joint tour, I was in the J2 however was routinely part of all J39 planning... I had my expertise, as did AF back seaters and space experts, army grunts, and a lot of retired military turned civilian....

[Sleeper]

So can we declare the NIOC fad "over" and go back to being NSGAs?

[Cryptonite]

Sorry coming into this late. Finally wrapped up the Doctorate degree so my time has been limited to contribute:

However, I did visit JIOWC (CJCS) few weeks back during a TAD trip to Texas. IO is still a robust capability, and the training pipeline/from a Joint Perspective is being refined. I don't think Senior IDC-IW leadership is tracking the progression, or for that matter cares, unless in the context of "IO Intelligence Integration" which includes targeting, Human Factors Analysis, and PMESII/JIOPOE/CIPE. There are some unique capabilities that IO brings to the table.

If you look across the Information Environment, Physical, Information, and Cognitive; Cyber/EW/SIGINT are all IO variables when looking at the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information.

[Sum1]

The two joint IO planners from JIOWC and integrated into the J39 at my command are:

O-5 Navy F-18 pilot who couldn't spell "IO" before this tour, and
O-4 Air Force behavioral scientist who never touched "IO" before this tour and likely never will again.

Thankfully, both are really smart and insanely capable people, but it very easily could have gone the other way. To my knowledge the Army is the only service with a dedicated IO officer force (FA-30s). I'm not saying we jump in, but the Navy also neglects something that could prove valuable if we played in the sandbox more often and with a little more knowledge/expertise. There's some really interesting things going on in the world right now pertaining to IO that are making serious impacts in fights where don't have 130,000 people on the ground anymore.