20yearman wrote:Definitely not equivalent to being a URL CO.
yoshi wrote:-we continue to report up to FCC/C10F via WAR as if operations at national sites and in overseas theaters are somehow owned by us. we give this information to someone who is completely powerless to do anything and has no authority to make decisions. and, we continually waste time and effort of our people in asking for it. why are we doing this?
yoshi wrote:-on our COs/community owning ops: the arrangements we have with NSA, CYBERCOM/FLTCYBER, and the Fleet Navy have our personnel involved in operations, but not ops which our community directs, determines, or owns (save maybe dco).
yoshi wrote:We're completely out of balance now, but i think we'll get fixed a little, at least on the cyber side when CYBERCOM splits out and starts doing title 10 at/with the regional COCOMs. probably be disappointing to the Navy crypotologic community, but not to the other services and the COCOMs.
yoshi wrote:Owning mission = decision authority to conduct operations in a given theater, whether they be joint (COCOM level) or component (#'d Fleet). Influencing, persuading, coordinating are not the same thing. Think about how many people we have in FCC/C10F doing the influencing, persuading, coordinating. Might they be as impactful if they were sitting in the COCOM/component CDR with the decision maker, rather than having to coordinate through their own organization's equities from thousands of miles away? Might those people better understand the intent of the COCOMs, might they more easily bring CYBERCOM success? Seems much easier to coordinate, influence, persuade in person rather than continuing to rely on a three star to pick up the phone to have the necessary impact. I don't think that's the solution - I think that's the problem. We do this routinely on one star staffs at O4 and O5, and with only one or two officers; we should be doing this at the COCOMs and Component CDRs with CAPTs who are not in the J2/N2.
The basic strategic flaw with the US military's cyber approach is it spoils unity of C2 within theaters, which is something you can't share or divide by domain. If you could do this, you wouldn't need an OTC/CWC. Sure, we can negotiate, influence, and deconflict. Is that timely and efficient enough to be viable in today's world (and I'm not even touching the career long targeting process yet)? Maybe for some Title 50 where an adversary doesn't know it's affected, but not for Title 10. No matter the technology, genius, or quality, there is no decision advantage when your operational process takes longer than your adversaries. Our approach has elevated the decision/action level required. Higher authority levels are inversely proportional to decision cycle speed. It takes far more people far more time to coordinate, execute, or forestall operations than if title 50 cyber belonged to theater COCOMs. CYBERCOM has to split off from NSA to be practically effective for military operations. We'll agree to disagree on this one.
The world is moving closer to Title 10 scenarios (Ukraine, North Korea, Iran) and preparedness requires our strategic design accommodate this fact. Thus, what we can learn from cyber/SIGINT/EW inherently must give way to what we can do, or support doing, with the same. It doesn't mean intelligence isn't important, it just means Title 10 requirements should be a priori matters (which clearly isn't the case today). This requires a change in approach and in our organizations.
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