COMEVIL wrote:It might be beneficial if we delineate specific IO roles and responsibilities that are being considered.
I understand that much of what we do falls under the very large umbrella of IO. I gree with everything that has been said about Cyber. I also believe that much of what we do in the J39/N39 falls in our swim lane.
What specific jobs in the milestone listing are you talking about? What specific IO roles and responsibilities are you talking about?
(BTW, this is being discussed over at Station HYPO, with the new tri-fold as the reference...)
yoshi wrote:First, CWO community must have/send officers experienced in multiple Fleet tours and also in what occurs outside of classified spaces (sometimes hard to find). CWO career path and O5 and above billet dispersion (an oxymoron) does not support.
yoshi wrote:Second, those officers need to be appropriately placed on staffs. CWO presence is typically heavy in the N2, usually N2/39. In this context, whether we think so or not, we work for the N2 and everyone else on those staffs also thinks so. One can guess what the focus is (intel) and what it isn't (operations).
yoshi wrote:USFFC, for example, still scrambles daily to do 2nd Fleet's job so they can produce an intel stand up for the guy responsible for MTE for the overall Navy (????). Sure, he's also dual hatted as CTF-80, but what's the value behind the brief - what operational decisions does it support? Those officers would be much more productive in the N3 working for CTF-80, planning fleet exercises, scheduling the Fleet, ensuring equities in Fleet maintenance (for our stuff), etc. If we want to have an operational impact within the Navy and COCOMs, some officers have to come out of C10F and out of the N2 at the 4-star staffs.).
yoshi wrote:No matter how good we get at our three things independently of the rest of the Navy or COCOMs, we have to eventually be able to connect it for those 4 star operational decision makers beyond the O4 level. We struggle with this. We have a great team, no doubt. We are also part of a larger team with has a much more expansive reach. Success isn't derived from technical depth, portfolio size, acquisitions, certain strategies or lines of operations; neither do those items assuredly translate into value. There is no system/structure/bureaucracy which can be built well enough to function without people as its focus. Success/value derive from the right people, the right place, and the right time. It takes coordination, constant staffing, understanding, sufficient representation within the Navy/Joint staffs, and providence.
Are we operating under the most optimum force model; considering our billet base and distribution. Why not leverage (IO) Operational Frameworks already created to address both Navy and Joint requirements. We tried in the past with a less than a fair commitment. Someone made the argument, that its not our job, but we are essentially already doing it and duplicating effort across the DoD. For example:
1. Technology Insertion (Duplicating numerous efforts or programs across DoD), often find out several agencies working on the same problem.
2. IO planning and integration
3. J3/N3 billets (#' Fleets, CCMD's, Afloat) - How do we crack this nut? ------------JWAC, JIOWC, JPSE,JEWC/ 1st IO/ Align with CMF Collection requirements/ EMW
1. Many of the comments made are in my opinion "First Conclusion Biased". They address the issues as we each individually understand them, but not the overall solution.
2. From the National Security Strategy, CNO's Vision, to Admiral Tighe's IWC strategy what are the greatest ROIs as they relate to Joint and Navy Strategic, Operational, and Tactical objectives.
Cryptonite wrote:I don't have all the answers. I thought this was a forum to generate answers/feedback. So with that I will conclude my comments.
Thanks to all for the great and awesome feedback.
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