COMEVIL wrote:Sum1 wrote:COMEVIL wrote:
Who is the target and what is the desired endstate? Does the Navy specifically have a role? What do we uniquely contribute that other forces cannot?
IO campaigns are typically targeted against people. Naval Forces, beyond NSW and NECC, don't typically interact with the local population in the way that ground troops do. So what exactly would a Naval force contribute to IO beyond broadcasts and pamphlets?
That question really needs to be asked while taking into account the phases of conflict and what your specific objectives are. Additionally, the question needs some kind of context because the implications at the tactical level are vastly different than the implications at the strategic or operational levels.
From a tactical level influencing individuals (KLE) or target audiences (MISO), the interaction with a population is important. What about virtual interactions through social media? Did we send a tactical message when we sent a couple Navy combatants to do counter-piracy in GOA? Why is a low altitude overpass sometimes in the ROE for the escalation of force? Would we do that if we assessed the target audience wouldn't see that "message" as credible? What about maritime capabilities leveraged to delivery other types of messaging? At the operational/strategic levels, what kind of message does our government send when they park a couple of CSGs off the coast of a foreign adversary? How is that action synchronized with SLEs between senior government officials of two or more nations? Does that synchronization amplify the intended message?
We can provide smart, strategic, critical thinkers who can help translate foreign policy into military strategy, which the services then use as guidance to do their jobs. At the very tip of the most pointy spear (or the deepest bowls of the most remotely operated warship) this stuff may seem inconsequential in the moment, but we (the U.S.) isn't in this for the short game. We NEED to be in that conversation because to ignore it means we continue operating in our stovepipe of excellence. If Information is really a warfighting domain and we consider it important in today's military, then we represent TWO elements of national power that absolutely must be leveraged in constructive ways.
All credible, important work. By why WE, as in the CWO community? Other than a misstep labeling us IW for a few years, we are plenty engaged in our current mission set -- SIGINT, Cyber, EW. And we can fill all of those jobs as it is. So why WE? Without additionally manpower, we shouldn't even consider it. Pretty certain, in fact, we are divesting for this very reason.
Great question. Before I give you my initial take on it, I would like to point out another misstep that's gone on for as long as I can remember (and I'd love to hear from others in longer, as well). This misstep is taking our unique skillsets and shoving us under N2/N6 when two out of our three main skillsets are quite clearly N3/J3 functions. Now, if you buy that, then it becomes clear that as IWC members we are probably best aligned to merge those technical, analytical, and operational considerations across all phases and levels of warfare. I couldn't help but smile today when someone chimed in during RADM Filipowski's Q&A about our over-reliance on technology. I had been thinking the EXACT same thing at that very moment, and had been about to jump in to assert that where we most often fail isn't technologically... we fail to manage the information that the technology gives us access to and we fail to smartly allocate limited resources (time, people, money, etc.). If every single one of us isn't questioning processes and looking for better ways to manage resources, then we're going to fail, even if we have the best tech and know-how money can buy. Someone has to be multi-faceted in the IWC. Leaving it to the flag deck isn't the right answer. I don't see Intel, Metoc or Space doing it. And for us to NOT do it means we leave it up to a terminal O-5 URL dude to do it for us.
The manpower issue you bring up is another hot button issue. I can say that all we keep hearing at the CCMD is how CYBERCOM needs more people and more money, but they can't tell us how they plan on using those scarce resources to support GCC requirements. They have CYBERCOM requirements. I'd argue that if your organization can't tie resource allocation decisions back to GCC/SOCOM warfighting requirements (phase 0 included), then you are wasting money. I was sitting in a room with a CYBERCOM LNO, NSA LNO, ARCYBER LNO, and half a dozen multi-service O-5's in a meeting not too long ago and, exasperatedly, asked to see the CMT's CAPES and LIMS doc. What the hell should a CMT be able to do? When was the GCC asked to inform the nominal team capabilities? What is the REQUIREMENT? Dude, you should have seen the looks on their faces. The NSA guy (former TAO'er, national mission team dude) just smiled at me. No one could say such a document exists. How do you man, train, and equip to a mission you haven't fully defined? I mean, that's planning 101. Conduct some mission analysis, maybe get some OR guys in a room to help you go through some COA models.
Sorry, I went off the deep end there for a second.